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Abstract: As critical piece of China’s gradualist economic transition, domestic price reform 
still faces major challenges. In particular, factor price, which is still tightly-controlled and not 
market-based, is lower than market equilibrium price. Factor price distortion not only reduces 
market efficiency but also affects wealth distribution. Subsequent wealth transfer has, over the 
past ten to fifteen years, created a powerful vested interests and spawned social resentment, both 
of which may constitute major hazards in China’s future reform and development. Keeping in 
mind that China will have to address factor price distortion in its next step of reform, this paper 
takes stock of China’s journey toward price reform; examines the relationship among factor price 
distortion, previous economic growth, and policy; and estimates the size of resulting wealth 
transfer. 
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I. Introduction 
Gradualist reform is one of the hallmarks of China’s economic transition. As stated by Young 
(2000), while this reform strategy has achieved great successes, it has also failed to solve many 
continuing problems due to dependence on previous policy. Price reform is a good example. After 
thirty years of reform, although the prices of most final commodities have become market-based, 
prices of many production factors such as land, natural gas, and electricity are still under 
government control. Despite criticism from Chinese academia on price controls1
Economic theories tell us that price distortion reduces the efficiency of resource allocation. If 
such distortion appears in the factors at the bottom of production chain, the negative impacts 
, reform of 
production factor pricing has been slow.  
Aside from institutional inertia, control of production factor prices is largely an outcome of 
China’s economic policies, which revolve around ensuring growth and stability. On the one hand, 
under-pricing of production factors has increased revenue for producers and is thus conducive to 
stimulating investment. Cheap factors are still a main reason behind the competitiveness of 
Chinese products in the international market. In addition, controlling production factor price is a 
powerful tool that can contain economic overheating and slow the increase of overall price levels 
caused by Balassa-Samuelson effect. Thus, price reform affects not only the macroeconomic 
environment but is tied into China’s social stability as well. Due to these considerations, China’s 
central government has treaded carefully on the issue.. 
                                                        
1 For such discussion, see Gong Min (2009). 
 would be even more serious. For China, a country in the process of economic transition, price 
distortion of production factors has another significant consequence that is in income distribution. 
Control of production factor prices leads directly to the transfer of wealth from factor owners to 
other users 
 Consequences of price distortion in China have already been discussed by some scholars. 
Xu (1993) estimated the degree of price distortion in various economic sectors using a computable 
general equilibrium model. Garbaccio (1994) estimated the effects of relaxed and enhanced price 
control of various sectors on profits, output, and employment. This paper will pay greater attention 
to the analysis of factor pricing from the perspective of political economy, i.e. the effects of price 
distortion on various interests. We aim to identify reasons why this system may be slow to reform, 
as well as its social and economic consequences. As Qin et al. (2009) found, inequalities in 
income distribution could have a significant effect on China’s macroeconomic stability and growth. 
This paper also considers the relationship between rent-seeking from natural resources and 
economic growth. Additionally, as indicated by Tornell (1992), Tornell and Lane (1999) and 
Torvik (2002), vested interests’ struggle for resource rents will threaten long-term economic 
growth. Our concern, in turn, is that the enormous vested interests generated by price distortion in 
China’s production factors are highly likely to contribute to such instability. 
This paper is structured as follows: Part II is a brief overview and discussion of China’s price 
reform; Part III discusses the relationship between the control of production factor prices and 
export-oriented economic policies through modeling; Part IV provides an empirical analysis that 
estimates the size of domestic and international wealth transfer caused by factor prices; and Part V 
offers conclusions. 
 
II. China’s price reform: overview and discussion 
Price adjustment began at the inception of China’s economic reform. At that time, China’s 
price reform followed a strategy of prioritization, differentiation, and double-tracking. Reform of 
commodity prices and the development of a commodities market outpaced those of factor prices 
and factor markets. Prices of agricultural products and industrial consumables were the first to be 
deregulated, followed by prices of intermediate inputs. At present, except for a few types of 
products, China has deregulated all commodity prices2
With the implementation of the household contract responsibility system in the early period 
of reform and opening, raising grain prices became the main thrust of policies aimed at stimulating 
economic growth. Between 1979 and 1984, the purchasing prices of 18 categories of agricultural 
and sideline products increased by 22.1 per cent. Later, China began to reduce fixed quotas for 
purchasing and marketing, increase negotiated purchase and marketing, and deregulate the prices 
of agricultural and sideline products. Given the great success of rural reform, price reform began 
to be carried out in cities in 1984. At the beginning, regulatory price re-adjustment still held sway. 
. In this respect, China has established a 
basic market economy. Reform of factor prices and opening of a factor market, on the other hand, 
have been much slower; government regulation is still visible..  
                                                        
2 According to the Pricing Catalogue of the NDRC and the State Council released on July 4, 2001, there are 13 
categories of commodities under regulatory pricing, which include central reserve materials, state-run industries 
producing or providing tobacco, salt, civil ammunition, certain chemical fertilizers, certain major medicines, 
textbooks, natural gas, central and cross-provincial water conservancy and water supplies, electric power, military 
goods, key transportation, basic postal services, basic telecom services, and important special services. 
 In an attempt to restore macroeconomic balance, China launched a thorough price reform effort 
involving interlocked pricing, tax, and fiscal changes. The result was serious inflation and 
skyrocketing demand, which led to social dislocation and the political turmoil of 1989. As a result, 
price reform was shelved, and reform in all areas came to a halt until Deng Xiaoping’s speeches 
on economic reform during his tour of southern China in 1992.  
Before the re-initiation of reform, China maintained regulatory power over the size of loans, 
interest rates, and access to the financial industry. In 1993, China began to undertake financial 
reform, marked by the enactment of Decisions on Matters Concerning the Establishment of A 
Socialist Market Economy and Decisions of the State Council on the Reform of the Financial 
System. China canceled its restrictions on the size of loans in 1998, deregulated interest rates in 
inter-bank markets and implemented and expanded the floating scope of loan interest rates in 1996, 
and relaxed control on the upper limit of loan interest rates for commercial banks in 2004 
(Monetary Policy Analysis Panel, the People’s Bank of China, 2005). Officially, the central bank 
still regulates the lower limit of loan interest rates and the upper limit of savings interest rates, 
although there is often a large discrepancy between the official interest rate and private interest 
rates (see Figure 1). 
 
 
   Figure 1: Savings and loan interest rates, actual interest rates, and private loan interest 
rates in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province (%) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007). Monthly statistics on private loan interest rates in 
Wenzhou are the result of monitoring conducted by the Wenzhou Branch of the People’s Bank of 
China (central bank) from three hundred monitoring points. 
 
Prior to and during the initial stages of reform, China adopted strict foreign exchange 
controls and a fixed exchange rate system, with the foreign exchange rate highly over-valued. As 
the exchange rate depreciated and China began to implement foreign exchange reserve holdings, 
and foreign exchange quota transaction systems, a system developed under which the official 
exchange rate, the black market exchange rate, and the foreign exchange quota transaction 
 exchange rate existed side by side. In 1994, exchange rate reform helped achieve exchange rate 
integration, which occurred in sync with rapid exchange rate depreciation. After excessive 
depreciation, the renminbi exchange rate began a slow process of appreciation. In 1996, China 
acceded to GATT and began to phase in free convertibility under current accounts. In 1998, with 
the eruption of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese government declared it would not devalue 
the renminbi and decided to re-adopt a fixed exchange rate system. Afterwards, the short-lived 
expectation of depreciation was replaced by the expectation of long-term appreciation beginning 
in 2002. The reform of the foreign exchange system on July 21, 2005 phased in the managed 
floating exchange rate system and gradually relaxed some capital account restrictions. Since then, 
the renminbi has appreciated slightly. Due to foreign exchange controls and a weakening U.S. 
dollar, the renminbi had appreciated by a cumulative 10.89 per cent against the US dollar as of  
November 23, 2007, while having depreciated by 9.59 per cent against the euro. According to a 
report by the World Bank, China’s PPP-based exchange rate was 3.4 in 20043
                                                        
3 Quoted from China Economic Quarterly, the World Bank, China office, February 2008. 
. On the whole, it is 
clear that the renminbi exchange rate is undervalued. 
In China, land resources and the land market are controlled mainly by local governments. 
The current land system in China is a hybrid system in which collective land and state-owned land 
and farmland and construction land are administered according to different systems. In rural areas, 
the primary distribution and redistribution of land-use rights are conducted by village-level 
organizations. In many parts of rural China, land contract rights cannot be freely transferred or 
traded: the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land requires both government 
approval and land acquisition by the government as an intermediary step before the land is used 
for non-agricultural construction. In the process of land acquisition, compensation awarded to the 
original user is based on the value of losses rather than on the market price. This has led to a huge 
discrepancy between land acquisition cost and land transfer price (see Figure 2) and has 
constituted a major source of government revenue. 
As with land, the acquisition and revenue distribution of other natural resources in China 
such as petroleum, natural gas, and coal are not determined by the market. Resource royalties are 
tantamount to an administrative fee, and amounts are much lower than average resource prices in 
the market. Valuable intangible resources such as television, broadcasting, and wireless 
communication channels, among others, are also offered for industry use at exceedingly low prices 
(Zhang, 2006). Due to free access to and symbolic pricing of resources, the pricing mechanism of 
resource goods is distorted by incomplete price composition, an excessively low price level, and 
unreasonable price parity relations. Despite multiple price increases, resource royalties have 
always been tightly regulated. Although China has attempted to address several unreasonable price 
parity relations, such as coal and electricity prices within China and between domestic and 
international oil prices, these measures have failed to be properly implemented and achieve 
expected results. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Compensation for land acquisition versus secondary market land price 
(yuan/m2) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007) 
 
Since reform and opening-up in 1978, as food supply became less of a problem and control 
over residence registration loosened, China began to witness a massive migration of rural dwellers 
to cities, which has continued to the present day. Although this inflow of labor was responsible for 
the development of an informal labor market in urban areas, institutional barriers between China’s 
urban and rural areas have remained high. Local governments and industries are preoccupied with 
economic performance, neglecting safety, hygiene, and working conditions. In urban formal labor 
markets, on the other hand, employers and employees are given freedom of choice and the right to 
termination, enabled by multiple reforms in organization, dismissal, early retirement, and 
lump-sum severance pay. General labor prices are also deregulated. Salaries of entrepreneurs, 
intellectuals, and skilled workers, however, are still under regulatory control. 
In a word, the market-oriented reforms of capital, land, and labor are far from complete, and 
prices are still largely under regulatory control. Factor prices are seriously undervalued and price 
parity relations between factors and products are artificially distorted. In short, government control  
of and dominance in the market for production factors has been a hallmark of the modern Chinese 
economy (Zhang Shuguang, 2007). 
 
III. Factor price distortion: causes and effects 
 
(I) Export-led growth strategy, inflation, and factor under-pricing 
Consider an open economy that adopts a fixed exchange rate system and includes two sectors 
of tradable goods and non-tradable goods. Nominal total demand in this economy can be 
expressed as: 
D D D D D
Y C I G XP Y P C P I P G P X⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅             (1) 
 
 where DY , DC , DI , DG , and 
DX  are actual total demand, actual consumption, investment, 
government spending, and net export demand, respectively, and YP , CP , IP , GP , and XP  are 
the price levels of corresponding demands. Nominal consumer demand is determined in the 
following way: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
D D
Y Y C F
D D D
C C F C Y C F Y
D D
C Y C Y C F
P Y P Y P C
P C P C P Y P C P Y
P Y P Y P C
τ τ
λ τ τ
λ τ λ τ
 − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ < ⋅
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ < ⋅ ≤ − ⋅ ⋅
 ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ⋅
 
Where τ  is the government tax rate and FC  is basic consumer demand. Consumer demand as 
it is expressed in the above formula means that households must first use their disposable income 
to satisfy certain basic consumer needs. Then, consumption and savings are divided, using cλ  
proportion of income to represent consumption and the remainder to indicate savings. The realistic 
background of this assumption is that major uncertainties during an economic transition make it 
difficult for people to properly assess future income, spending, and investment returns. In this case, 
they can only adopt a simple set of income distribution rules. Psychological aversion to risk also 
lessens the share of consumption in income Cλ  and raises the savings rate. 
Economically desirable nominal investment demand is a linear function of nominal total 
demand. It can only be fulfilled after consumer demand. Hence: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
D
Y C F
D D D D
I Y C F C F Y C I Y
D D D D
I Y Y C I Y C Y C F
P Y P C
P I P Y P C P C P Y P Y
P Y P Y P Y P Y P C
τ
τ τ λ τ λ
λ τ λ τ λ λ τ
 − ⋅ ⋅ < ⋅
⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ≤ − ⋅ ⋅ < ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅   

⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ > ⋅    且
 
We assume C I 1λ λ+ < ; i.e. savings exceed investment. 
The Chinese government practices operating on a balanced budget, thus: 
D D
G YP G P Yτ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅  
As we have configured the current model, if government spending and current account 
surpluses do not exist—i.e.,  0τ =  and 0DX =  –we have the following constant equation: 
D
Y C FP Y P C⋅ = ⋅  
This means that under conditions where output capacity exceeds basic consumer demand, the 
economy cannot achieve a sufficient utilization of resources. 
 We choose to focus, however, on another situation, i.e. one in which the government 
promotes economic expansion through spending and export in order to avoid the problem of 
insufficient consumption. Thus, 
( )1D DC C YP C P Yλ τ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅  
D D
I I YP I P Yλ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅  
Equation (1) gives us: 
( )1 1 D DC I Y XP Y P Xλ τ λ τ− ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅      (2) 
Subsequently, the above demand is decomposed into tradable and non-tradable goods sectors. 
The Cobb-Douglas utility function applies to households: 
( ), a bT N T Nu y y y y= ⋅  
where Ty  and Ny  are acquired tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. We then use a 
first-order condition of maximal utility: 
D
T T C
aP C P C
a b
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
D
N N C
bP C P C
a b
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
where TP  and NP  are the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively, and TC  and 
NC  represent consumer demand for tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. 
Investment formation takes the following form: 
c d
I T NI A I I= ⋅ ⋅  
where TI  and NI  are tradable goods and non-tradable goods for investment, and IA  is the  
productivity coefficient. Given its Cobb-Douglas form, this gives us: 
D
T T I
cP I P I
c d
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
D
N N I
dP I P I
c d
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
Government spending is complex, as it includes both consumption and investment. For purposes 
of this paper, we assume that the proportions of and investments in tradable goods and 
non-tradable goods are equal, i.e.: 
D
T T G
cP G P G
c d
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
D
N N G
dP G P G
c d
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
+
 
Obviously, net export is equivalent to all tradable goods, hence: 
X TP P=  
 Summarizing the above expressions and replacing nominal total demand with 
D
Y T T N NP Y P Y P Y⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅  give us the relationship between tradable goods and non-tradable 
goods: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
C I T T
C I N N
b d P Y
a b c d
b d P Y
a b c d
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + 
 = − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + 
 
Thus: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
C I
T T
N N
C I
b d
P Y a b c d
b dP Y
a b c d
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ
− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +⋅ + +=
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +
+ +
    (3) 
Regarding the supply side, we calculate the production function of tradable goods and 
non-tradable goods: 
T T T T TY A K L Z
α β γ= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅        1α β γ+ + =  
N N N N NY A K L Z
θ ϕ ω= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅        1θ ϕ ω+ + =  
where iK , iL , and iZ  are capital, labor, and resource (such as energy, land, and ores) inputs 
for the two sectors. TA  and NA  are the production coefficients of both sectors. We assume 
α θ> , β ϕ<  and γ ω< , i.e. that the production of tradable goods is relatively 
capital-intensive, while the production of non-tradable goods requires more labor and resources. 
We reason that most tradable goods are industrial goods, while the greater part of non-tradable 
goods is closely related to non-tradable factor inputs, such as land, both in the service and 
consumption phases. Capital, labor, and total resource inputs in the economy are K , L , and Z  
respectively, hence: 
T NK K K+ =  
T NL L L+ =  
T NZ Z Z+ =  
Minimization of production cost gives the following first-order conditions: 
1
T T T T TP A K L Z r
α β γα −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     (4) 
1
T T T T TP A K L Z w
α β γβ −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     (5) 
1
T T T T TP A K L Z h
α β γγ −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     (6) 
 1
N N N N NP A K L Z r
θ ϕ ωθ −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =    (7) 
1
N N N N NP A K L Z w
θ ϕ ωϕ −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     (8) 
1
N N N N NP A K L Z h
θ ϕ ωω −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     (9) 
where r , w , and h  represent interest rates, wage rates, and resource prices, respectively. 
Combining the production functions of both sectors using equations (4) and (7) gives us: 
T T T
N N N
P Y K
P Y K
θ
α
⋅
= ⋅
⋅
    (10) 
Substituting equation (3) gives us: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
C I
T
N
C I
b d
K a b c d
b dK
a b c d
α λ τ λ τ
θ λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + + + =
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
Thus, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
C I
T
C I
b d
a b c dK K
b d
a b c d
α λ τ λ τ
α θ α λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
C I
N
C I
b d
a b c dK K
b d
a b c d
θ λ τ λ τ
α θ α λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
By the same token, the distribution of labor and resources in both sectors can be represented as 
follows: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
C I
T
C I
b d
a b c dL L
b d
a b c d
β λ τ λ τ
β ϕ β λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
C I
N
C I
b d
a b c dL L
b d
a b c d
ϕ λ τ λ τ
β ϕ β λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
C I
T
C I
b d
a b c dZ Z
b d
a b c d
γ λ τ λ τ
γ ω γ λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
C I
N
C I
b d
a b c dZ Z
b d
a b c d
ω λ τ λ τ
γ ω γ λ τ λ τ
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + = ⋅
 + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + + 
 
Substituting into the production functions of both sectors gives us: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
1
1
T T C I
C I
C I
C I
b dY A
a b c d
b d
a b c d
b d
a b c d
b d K L Z
a b c d
α β γ
α
β
γ
α β γ
λ τ λ τ α β γ
α θ α λ τ λ τ
β ϕ β λ τ λ τ
γ ω γ λ τ λ τ
−
−
−
 = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + 
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  + +  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
N N C I
C I
C I
C I
b dY A
a b c d
b d
a b c d
b d
a b c d
b d K L Z
a b c d
θ ϕ ω
θ
ϕ
ω
θ ϕ ω
λ τ λ τ θ ϕ ω
α θ α λ τ λ τ
β ϕ β λ τ λ τ
γ ω γ λ τ λ τ
−
−
−
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + 
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  + +  
 
According to equation (3), the nominal total output value of the economy can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
Y T T N N T T
C I
P Y P Y P Y P Yb d
a b c d
λ τ λ τ
⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +
+ +
 
Assuming that the tax rate, marginal consumption, and investment tendency remain constant, the 
nominal GDP growth rate can be expressed as follows: 
T T T T
NGDP
T T T T
P Y P A K L Zg
P Y P A K L Z
α β γ= + = + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
     
            (11) 
Because of the fixed exchange rate system, prices of tradable goods are determined 
exogenously. We assume that international prices of tradable goods remain constant, i.e. 0TP = , 
and that the economic growth rate is subject to technological progress plus factor inputs. At the 
 same time, equation (10) gives us the relative price ratio between non-tradable goods and tradable 
goods. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
C I
N T
T N
C I
T N
C I
C I
C I
b d
P Y a b c d
b dP Y
a b c d
A A
b d
a b c d
b d
a b c d
b d
a b c d
α β γ θ ϕ ω
θ α
ϕ β
λ τ λ τ
λ τ λ τ
α β γ θ ϕ ω
α θ α λ τ λ τ
β ϕ β λ τ λ τ
γ ω γ λ τ λ τ
− − − −
−
−
⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +
+ += ⋅
− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +
+ +
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
  ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ +  + +  
⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + + +
K L Z
ω γ
α θ β ϕ γ ω
−
− − −  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
 
Taking the differential of both sides gives us: 
( ) ( ) ( )N NT T
N T T N
P AP A K L Z
P P A A K L Z
α θ β ϕ γ ω− = − + − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − ⋅
    
        (12) 
We assume NT
T N
AA
A A
>

; i.e., technological progress in the tradable goods sector outpaces that of 
the non-tradable goods sector. This implies that its effect on the prices of non-tradable goods is 
positive, which is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Given α θ> , β ϕ< , and 
γ ω< , the effect of capital accumulation on the prices of non-tradable goods is also positive, 
while the effect of increased labor and resources is negative. 
 
Consumer price index in the economy is represented as: 
0 0
NT
T N
PPa b
P PCPI
a b
⋅ + ⋅
=
+
 
where 0TP  and 0NP  are the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods for the base period and 
the inflation rate is: 
0 0
0 0
NT
T N
NT
T N
PPa b
P P
PPa b
P P
π
⋅ + ⋅
=
⋅ + ⋅

 
Given the constant prices of tradable commodities, we calculate: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
0
0
0
N
N N
N
NT
N T N
N
Pb
P Pa b
P
AAb K L Z
P A A K L Za b
P
π
α θ β ϕ γ ω
= ⋅
+ ⋅
 
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − ⋅ 
 + ⋅

   
       (13) 
Comparing equation (13) with equation (11) and with our analysis on equation (12), we can 
see that under the fixed exchange rate system, economic growth driven primarily by technological 
progress and capital accumulation will inevitably be accompanied by a certain degree of inflation. 
If the government wishes to keep inflation low during periods of high growth, price controls to 
expand the supply of labor and resources are a necessary tool. 
 
(II) Factor price control and income transfer 
We examine the income transfer process produced by price controls using the resources 
sector in the above model as our example. If the resource sector contains n types of specific 
resources used as inputs for the whole of production, we get: 
1
1
n
i
i
Z z
σ
σ
=
 
=  
 
∑    ( )0 1σ< <               (14) 
where iz  is type i of the specific resource of price ip . For each type of specific resource, we 
assume an intermediary dealer who acquires resources from owners at purchasing price Cip  and 
sells them to the market at price Mip  to the market. 
Substituting equation (14) into the production function of the tradable goods sector gives us: 
1
n
T T T T Ti
i
Y A K L z
γ
σ
α β σ
=
 
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
∑  
where Tiz  is the specific resource input for the tradable goods sector. The first-order condition of 
profit maximization on final products for producers is: 
1
1
1
n
i
T T T Ti Ti
i T
pA K L z z
P
γ
σ
α β σ σγ
−
−
=
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 
 
∑  
If we assume multiple types of resources, the market influence of individual resource intermediary 
dealers is negligible. Hence, we use 
1
1
n
T T T Ti
i
A K L z
γ
σ
α β σγ
−
=
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
∑  and TP . Demand elasticity 
from final product manufacturers for each specific resource is ( )
1
1σ − , which is subject to the 
composition of overall resources Z and does not take into account the parameters of the 
production function. Within the non-tradable goods sector, demand elasticity uses the same 
 expression, hence the elasticity of market demand for each specific resource may be 
written ( )
1
1σ − .  
 Intermediary dealers of each specific resource seek to maximize profits: 
( ) ( )M C MMi i i i ip p z pπ = − ⋅  
The corresponding first-order condition is: 
1 1
C
M i
i
pp
ε
=
+
 
where ε  is the demand elasticity of iz . Thus, 
C
M i
i
pp
σ
=  
This means that for any decrease of purchasing price Cip∆ , the market price of specific resources 
falls by 
C
Ci
i
p p
σ
∆
> ∆ , meaning that implementing controls on resource purchasing prices can 
effectively reduce the market price of resources. At the same time, we observe that for a small 
decrease in purchasing price Cip∆ , the corresponding change to resource demand are: 
1
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i
i iC
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Assuming that resource owners have cost curve ( )ic z  , determined by the rate of discount over 
time or by other factors, the change to the income of resource owners is: 
( ) ( )1 1
C C
C C Ci i i i
Ci i i i i i i iC C
i i
p z p zp p z c z p z c z
p p
π
σ σ
    ∆ ∆  ∆ = −∆ ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ −      − −    
 
Ignoring of the high order infinitesimal gives us the following approximation: 
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1 1
C
C i i
Ci i i i C
i
p zp z c z
p
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σ σ
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Of course, depending on the size of cost change, the direction of income change can vary. Here, 
we examine primarily 0Ciπ∆ <  and the existence of resource “oversupply” relative to optimal 
 time discount rate. Change to the income of intermediary dealers is: 
( ) 1
C C C C
C C Ci i i i i
Mi i i i i iC
i
p p p z pp p z p z
p
π
σ σ σ σ
       ∆ ∆
∆ = − − −∆ ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅       −       
 
which we can approximate as: 
C
Mi i ip zπ∆ = ∆ ⋅  
In contrast to resource owners, intermediary dealers’ revenue after price adjustment is always 
positive and in direct proportion to the degree of price adjustment. In other words, one 
consequence of price adjustment is the transfer of income from resource owners to intermediary 
dealers. 
 
The above model has many implications for policy and resource purchasing. First of all, 
despite the model’s indication that income transfer is caused by the purchasing price of resources, 
it offers no clear indication of how income transfer affects social welfare overall. This is partially 
because we did not specifically define the social cost of inflation in our model. Another important 
reason lies in the market structure of resource supplies. The monopolistic position of intermediary 
dealers has caused (upward) distortion in the market prices of resources. This implies that 
government control of purchasing prices will compromise the interests of resource owners to some 
extent, but it will primarily help overcome the distortion caused by monopolistic pricing of 
intermediary dealers. Thus, the overall effect seems to be positive. On the other hand, however, 
any practice that aims to offset price distortion with another price distortion may wreak even 
greater havoc on the economy, giving rise to long-term effects that are difficult to predict. As a 
result, a question that arises is why the government has thus far refrained from directly controlling 
market prices set by intermediary dealers. While this kind of intervention has been implemented, it 
has only been minimally successful; this is due to the government’s disadvantage vis-à-vis 
information access and negotiation capabilities4
1. Wealth transfer to administrative monopolistic sectors 
. Lastly, certain resources, such as petroleum and 
the wireless spectrum, play a far greater role in the economy than the model suggests. Suppliers of 
these resources also wield far more market power. In this respect, their behavior could be seen as 
more akin to oligarchic competition than to monopolistic competition in the market. This being 
said, the relationship between price distortion and income transfer , as well as its mechanism, are 
roughly consistent with our model.  
 
IV. Simple estimate of wealth transfer 
 
(I) Domestic wealth transfer caused by factor price distortion 
The effects of wealth transfer domestically caused by factor price undervaluation are 
threefold: first, wealth transfer from general sectors to administrative monopolistic sectors; second, 
wealth transfer from individuals to the government; and third, wealth transfer from workers to 
asset owners. 
                                                        
4 Numerous links in the resource processing chain are controlled by powerful interests in the form of local 
governments and large, high-ranking state-owned enterprises. In contrast, it is easier to exert control over resource 
owners at the bottom of the production chain or through administrative channels. 
 China’s administrative monopoly is concentrated in seven industries: tobacco, electricity, 
petroleum mining and processing, transportation, postal and telecom services, broadcasting and 
television, and finance and insurance5
 
. Table 1 calculates relevant information from these 16 
sectors in 2002. 
 
Table 1: Shares of 16 monopolistic sectors in the national economy 
 
Labor wage 
(million 
yuan) 
Net 
production 
tax (million  
yuan) 
Depreciation 
(million  
yuan) 
Operating 
surplus 
(million  
yuan) 
Sum of value 
addition 
(million  
yuan) 
Employment 
(thousand 
people) 
Per capita 
wage 
(yuan) 
Petroleum 
and natural 
gas mining 
44,978.71 40,232.24 51,639.93 95,244.88 232,095.77 770 58,414 
Tobacco 
industry  
7,808.92 91,573.76 5,555.88 25,906.93 130,845.49 230 33,952 
Petroleum 
and nuclear 
fuel 
processing  
 
23,850.86 30,301.29 16,466.76 13,023.67 83,642.58 560 42,591 
Electricity 
and heat 
production 
and supply  
 
85,474.75 79,367.92 108,562.08 122,840.57 396,245.32 2,850 35,511 
Gas 
production 
and supply  
3,003.10 1,380.11 3,030.35 1.55 7,415.11 Included in 
the 
“Electricity 
and heat 
production 
and supply” 
column 
Included in 
the 
“Electricity 
and heat 
production 
and 
supply” 
column 
Water 
production 
and supply  
12,728.21 3,877.79 12,008.74 264.02 28,350.72 Included in 
the 
“Electricity 
and heat 
production 
Included in 
the 
“Electricity 
and heat 
production 
                                                        
5 In an interview with Xinhua News Agency, Director of the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) Li Rongrong said that state economy will maintain absolute control over these seven 
strategically important industries. In addition, Li mentioned a plan to develop 30 to 50 internationally competitive 
large corporate conglomerates in the following seven sectors: military and weapons manufacturing, power grids 
and electricity, petroleum and petrochemical production, telecom, coal, civil aviation, and shipping. The reason 
television, broadcasting, finance, and insurance were not mentioned is that these sectors do not fall under the 
purview of the SASAC.  
 and supply” 
column 
and 
supply” 
column 
Railway 
passenger 
transport  
35,490.18 4,105.14 18,779.56 3,758.07 62,132.96 1,160 66,470 
Railway 
freight 
transport  
41,614.84 5,015.75 24,422.65 10,839.99 81,893.23 Included in 
the 
“Railway 
passenger 
transport” 
column 
Same as 
above 
Air passenger 
transport  
7,455.36 6,300.57 12,311.09 7,071.14 33,138.16 130 101,679 
Air cargo 
transport  
5,762.95 2,047.16 5,653.40 1,670.97 15,134.48 Included in 
the “Air 
passenger 
transport” 
column 
Same as 
above 
Pipeline 
transportation  
779.75 288.85 1,591.42 1,819.79 4,479.80 20 38,988 
Postal 
Industry  
15,229.98 1,787.36 2,964.59 411.66 20,393.59 330 46,151 
Information 
transmission 
services  
49,766.93 13,456.51 106,789.57 100,110.74 270,123.74 610 81,585 
Financial 
sector  
121,918.09 5,038.62 49,144.87 244,142.92 420,244.50 2,870 47,941 
Insurance  15,673.69 6,400.43 8,222.38 17,100.68 47,397.19 Included in 
“Financial 
sector” 
column 
Same as 
above 
Radio and 
Television 
Culture and 
Arts  
32,738.79 5,442.52 3,795.25 11,430.13 53,406.68 860 38,291 
Monopoly 
sector in total 
504,275.13 296,616.01 430,938.52 655,109.66 1,886,939.32 10,390 48,558 
Whole 
society 
5,895,049.93 1,746,221.13 1,874,056.72 2,670,562.63 12,185,890.41 737,400 7,994 
Deducting 
the sector of 
agriculture, 
forestry and 
4,563,453.07 1,691,756.08 1,797,565.40 2,462,690.69 10,522,843.79 105,580 43,223 
 animal 
husbandry① 
Share of 
monopolistic 
sector I ② 
0.0855 0.1699 0.23 0.2454 0.1548 0.0141 
 
 
Share of 
monopolistic 
sector II ③ 
0.1105 0.1753 0.2397 0.266 0.1793 0.0984  
Note: ① is total national economy, not including the agriculture, forestry, and animal 
husbandry sectors; ② is the share of monopolistic sectors in the national economy; and ③ is the 
share of monopolistic sectors in the national economy, not including the agriculture, forestry, and 
animal husbandry sectors. 
Source: Calculated using input/output (producer price) sheets for 122 sectors for 2002 from 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
 
The above table indicates that these 16 monopolistic sectors show larger shares of 
depreciation and operating surplus than value added. Whether the agriculture, forestry, and animal 
husbandry are included or excluded, their share of operating surplus exceeds the share of their 
value added by roughly nine percentage points, or 50 per cent. It is likely, moreover, that their 
share of depreciation and operating surplus has been even higher in recent years. Before 2007, 
state-owned monopolistic enterprises had retained all their own profits. Measured against the 
share of value added, the transfer of social wealth to monopolistic sectors in 2002 may have been 
as high as 213.5 to 241.7 billion yuan. In other words, due to relative price distortion, the social 
wealth transferred to monopolistic sectors accounts for 32.6 per cent to 36.9 per cent of their total 
operating surplus.  
Although the share of wages for monopolistic sectors is lower than value added, their share 
of employment takes an even smaller share. Excluding agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry, 
wages in monopolistic sectors still show a higher share than that of their total employment by 1.21 
percentage points, i.e. 12.3 per cent. In monopolistic sectors, moreover, per capita wages are 
higher than the national average by 5,335 yuan. If the excess wages are included in our 
calculations, wealth transferred to China’s monopolistic sectors in 2002 amounts to between 268.9 
and 297.1 billion yuan, which constitutes 18.5 to 20.4 per cent of national income in monopolistic 
sectors. If the depreciation rate in monopolistic sectors is equal to the national average, the wealth 
transfer to monopolistic sectors would still increase by between 108.6 and 140.9 billion yuan,  
reaching a total of more than 400 billion yuan and accounting for more than 21.5 per cent of value 
added in monopolistic sectors. In the past five years, China’s GDP has shown an average annual 
growth rate of 10.6 per cent, and profits from industrial sectors have grown by 33.9 per cent, both 
figures higher than their 2002 levels (9.1 per cent and 22.2 per cent, respectively). Monopolistic 
sectors experienced even faster growth of profits, with some shares constituting an even higher 
proportion of the national economy. Hence, wealth transfer to monopolistic sectors in the past five 
years is faster and larger than ever. 
 
2. Wealth transfer to the government 
    The Chinese government is the principle controller of resources, especially land resources. 
 Undervaluation of factor prices, therefore, has caused wealth to be transferred from individuals to 
the government. Figure 3 and Table 2 show this dimension of domestic wealth transfer in detail. 
 
 
Figure 3: Household income and fiscal revenue growth, 1998 to 2006 (%) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2007 
 
Figure 3 calculates the growth of urban and rural household incomes using national census 
information and compares them with the growth of fiscal revenue. Except for 2002, when urban 
household income growth was slightly higher than fiscal revenue, and 2003, when urban and rural 
household income growth rates are relatively close, government revenue growth has been much 
higher than household income growth over the past decade. While urban and rural households’ 
annual average revenue growth rates over the past ten years were18.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent, 
respectively, government revenue growth was 1.71 times higher than urban household revenue 
growth. 
 
Table 2: Consumption, savings, and disposable income among government, household, and 
commercial sectors 
 Disposable 
total 
income 
(billion 
yuan) 
Household sector 
 Disposable 
income 
(billion 
yuan) 
Share of 
disposable 
income 
(%) 
Consumption 
rate (%) 
Savings 
rate 
(%) 
1995 5993.02 4029.16 67.23 47.34 19.89 
1996 7032.04 4812.51 68.44 48.29 20.15 
1995 5993.02 4029.16 67.23 47.34 19.89 
1996 7032.04 4812.51 68.44 48.29 20.15 
1997 7848.71 5384.22 68.60 47.04 21.56 
1998 8337.90 5704.35 68.41 47.05 21.37 
1999 8888.85 5973.31 67.20 47.16 20.04 
2000 9852.29 6325.17 64.20 46.54 17.66 
 2001 10877.05 6743.75 62.00 45.24 16.75 
2002 12017.18 7330.49 61.00 43.75 17.25 
2003 13663.40 8170.70 59.80 41.60 18.20 
2004 16148.32 9338.79 57.83 39.53 18.30 
 
 Government sector Commercial sector 
 Disposabl
e income 
(billion 
yuan) 
Share of 
disposabl
e income 
(%) 
Consumption 
rate (%) 
Savings 
rate 
(%) 
Savings (disposable 
income) (billion 
yuan) 
Savings rate 
(%) 
1995 991.61 16.55 13.98 2.57 972.25 16.22 
1996 1257.03 17.88 14.17 3.71 962.49 13.69 
1997 1436.31 18.30 14.29 4.01 1028.18 13.10 
1998 1511.95 18.13 14.82 3.31 1121.60 13.45 
1999 1608.88 18.10 15.43 2.67 1306.66 14.70 
2000 1891.64 19.20 15.90 3.30 1635.48 16.60 
2001 2229.77 20.50 16.24 4.26 1903.52 17.50 
2002 2523.56 21.00 15.91 5.09 2163.14 18.00 
2003 3005.99 22.00 15.09 6.91 2486.71 18.20 
2004 3052.20 18.90 14.37 4.53 3757.33 23.27 
 
Source: Cash flow statements (in-kind transactions), 1995 to 2004. Historical Information 
on China’s Cash Flow Statements: 1992 to 2004, China Statistics Press, 2008. 
 
Table 2 calculates the consumption, savings, disposable income, and the shares of 
disposable income among government, households, and the commercial sector according to 
adjusted cash flow statements (in-kind transactions) from Historical Information on China’s Cash 
Flow Statements:1992 to 2004. Figures indicate that between 1995 and 2004, the savings and 
consumption rates rose for the government sector, while the share of its disposable income rose 
from 16.55 per cent to 18.90 per cent, reaching a peak of 22 per cent in 2003. On the other hand, 
saving and consumption rates for the household sector declined steadily; the share of household 
disposable incomes, in particular, dropped from 67.23 per cent to 57.83 per cent, down almost ten 
percentage points. Disposable income in the commercial sector increased dramatically after 2000. 
 
The above tables provides a description of wealth transfer to the government in recent years 
using available information. This description, however, is insufficient. Fiscal revenue describes 
only government budgetary revenue, not all government revenue. This is illustrated by the relative 
share of disposable income to fiscal revenue. For instance, in 2004 the government’s disposable 
income was 3,052.2 billion yuan; fiscal revenue, on the other hand, was 2,639.647 billion. The 
former exceeds the latter by 412.553 billion yuan. We believe the figures for disposable income 
more accurately reflect China’s current fiscal situation; the answer depends, however, on China’s 
current fiscal system, as well as the methods used to generate government revenues. 
Under China’s current fiscal system, government revenues are generated in four ways: the 
first is budgetary revenue. This figure is usually accurate for its scope. The revenue, seemingly not 
 a big portion, is often cited by Chinese tax authorities in response to criticism from international 
community6. The second source of revenue is extra-budgetary revenue. This figure also in official 
statistics. According to estimates, the proportion of budgetary to extra-budgetary revenue was 
roughly 1:1 before the Chinese government launched an initiative to lower it to 1:0.67
Extra-budgetary revenue has two principle sources: land transfer fees and social security 
revenue. Over the years, land transfer fees have constituted a major source of local 
extra-budgetary revenue, and the difference between land purchasing fees paid by real estate 
developers and the amount of compensation to lessees is only a small part. In 2004, China’s land 
transfer fees amounted to 589.4 billion yuan. In 2005, they reached 550.5 billion yuan (land 
purchase fees were less than 300 billion yuan that year). In 2006, they exceeded 700 billion yuan 
and, according to economist Ping Xinqiao’s estimate, exceeded one trillion yuan
. If we 
assume the lower proportion is correct, China’s extra-budgetary revenue in 2004 was 1,683.7 
billion yuan.  
8
Excessively low resource factor rents not only increase profits in monopolistic sectors but 
also magnify their profits from general commodities. As a result of artificially increased profits, 
.  
The third type of government revenue is extra-system revenue, which lacks reliable 
estimates. In the early 1990s, using information from surveys, Fan Gang estimated that the 
extra-system revenue of various levels of government in the year 1994 accounted for 30 per cent 
of local budgetary revenue. In Table 2, government disposable income is less than the sum of 
budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue by 57.365 billion yuan (= 3,052.2 billion yuan – 
2,639.647 billion yuan - 469.918 billion yuan).  
Lastly, government revenue also takes the form of levying fees on the commercial sector 
for routine tasks. These statistics are even less available. Putting these four sources of revenue 
together, the share of government disposable revenue in the nation’s GDP is rather high. To 
illustrate, if from 2000 to 2004 the household consumption rate and the investment rate fell to 
their average levels during the period from 1995 to 1999, and government disposable income 
maintained its average increase over those years,, wealth transfer from individuals to the 
government would amount to 1,573.911 billion yuan, or 314.782 billion yuan per year. In 2003, 
this figure would be as high as 575.229 billion yuan. 
 
3. Wealth transfer to asset owners 
China is in the process of asset revaluation, an important economic phenomenon that occurs 
as developing economies transition to developed economies. As the lesson of history demonstrates, 
however, the process of asset price revaluation is fraught with risks and is often accompanied by 
rapid increases in asset prices and asset bubble inflation. Artificial undervaluation of factor and 
resource prices will pull down the prices of general commodities and distort the price parity 
relationship between general commodities and asset prices, causing wealth to transfer to asset 
owners.  
                                                        
6 May 15, 2007, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao reported that according to the recent Global Tax Misery Rank by 
Forbes, China continued to be the most tax miserable country among Asian economies, ranking the third in the 
world with tax misery index of 152, which is lower than France (166.8) and Belgium (156.4). China’s State 
Administration of Taxation rejected this report, claiming that China’s macro-tax burden is currently at a low level 
in the world and the so-called conclusion that China’s tax burden is second or third heaviest in the world is 
scientifically unfounded and contradicts with the reality (see Beijing Morning Post, August 4, 2007). 
7 See Nanfang Daily, May 27, 2007. 
8 See China Youth Daily, April 23, 2008. 
 the market value of assets will inevitably be overvalued. This is demonstrated by the fact that asset 
price inflation in China has been much higher compared to the general commodity price inflation. 
Between 1997 and the third quarter of 2007, China’s CPI increased by only 10.96 per cent, while 
RPI decreased by 1.65 per cent, with growth rates of 0.1 per cent and -0.2 per cent per year, 
respectively. However, asset price inflation increased at a faster rate. During this period, real estate 
sales prices rose 80.74 per cent and stock price indices ballooned to 3.65 times their previous 
levels, i.e., a growth rate of 6.1 per cent and 16.6 per cent per year, respectively. In the past few 
years, asset price inflation has become even more rampant. Real increases of property prices are 
much higher than official statistics. 
Figure 4 indicates the share of labor wage, net production tax, and depreciation plus 
operating surplus in GDP. While the share of wages declined annually, dropping from 52.78 per 
cent in 1995 to 47.14 per cent in 2004, a decrease of 5.64 percentage points, the share of 
depreciation plus operating surplus stayed above 30 per cent and increased steadily, up 4.69 
percentage points in 2004 from its 1995 level. If we calculate wealth transfer using the average 
share of wages (31.94 per cent between 1995 and 1999), China’s wealth transfer from workers to 
asset owners was an estimated 1,514.648 billion yuan, or 302.93 billion yuan per year. In 2004, 
this figure peaked at 957.671 billion yuan. Thus, we can see that wealth transfer from workers to 
asset owners has taken place on a similar scale to wealth transfer from individuals to government. 
 
 
Figure 4: Shares of wages and depreciation plus operating surplus in GDP (%) 
Source: Cash flow statements (in-kind transactions), 1995 to 2004. Historical Information 
on China’s Cash Flow Statements: 1992 to 2004, China Statistics Press, 2008. 
 
(II) International wealth transfer caused by factor price distortion 
In China, as factor and resource prices have been kept artificially low, it has caused reverse 
wealth transfers both within China as well as internationally; specifically, wealth has flowed from 
China, a relatively poor country, to richer countries in Europe and America. Under a price system 
that distorts relative domestic and international prices, international wealth transfer has taken 
place primarily through trade and capital flow. On the one hand, subsidies to foreign countries 
developed as Chinese exports increased, a result of undervalued trade commodity prices, which 
 itself was a result of undervaluing domestic factor and resource prices. Similarly, on the other 
hand, another form of exporter subsidy has arisen from import losses caused by international 
commodity price inflation and appreciation of the renminbi. Exchange rate losses and discounts 
have also caused wealth to flow out of China. 
Table 3 lists price indices of international bulk commodities and domestic industrial goods, as 
well as purchasing prices of energy, raw materials, and power. Over the past ten years, prices of 
international bulk commodities increased by a factor of 1.2. Metal prices, for example, rose by a 
factor of 1.7, while energy prices increased to 3.4 times that of previously levels. Prices of 
domestic retail commodities, by comparison, saw hardly any change. Purchasing prices of energy 
and raw materials increased only 33 per cent. Outside China, prices of industrial goods increased 
1.8 times, while ex-factory prices in China grew by only 12 per cent. These figures indicate that 
international wealth transfer is taking place on a large scale. 
 
Table 3: Price indices of international bulk commodities, domestic industrial goods, energy, 
and raw materials 
 International bulk commodities Domestic commodities 
 Total Metal Energy Industrial 
goods 
Retail 
commodities 
Industrial 
goods 
Fuel and 
raw 
materials 
1997  59.4772  67.8754  38.1902  86.2700 105.9839  94.5378  83.3097 
1998  47.7517  55.5493  26.9627  71.7340 103.2285  90.6663  79.7940 
1999  49.9169  55.3799  34.4349  71.3290 100.1392  88.4754  77.1662 
2000  63.2656  62.6991  53.6943  77.7412  98.6362  90.9664  81.1080 
2001  58.2790  56.2662  48.0124  72.5897  97.8569  89.7959  80.9304 
2002  58.3002  54.3214  47.1851  71.3800  96.5767  87.8151  79.0838 
2003  65.0462  64.7044  55.2302  75.3300  96.4932  89.8259  82.8835 
2004  80.4847  81.7048  72.4114  89.1579  99.1929  95.3181  92.3296 
2005 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2006 120.7135 156.1966 119.2351 136.3245 101.0020 103.0012 106.0014 
2007 134.9830 183.3120 131.6651 154.2824 104.8401 106.2372 110.6831 
 
Source: International bulk commodities indices are calculated using information from 
DRAFTS\COM\Monthly 05\PNProj\Price 05.Bnk, TYPE=LAREMOS. The information was 
collected with the assistance of the Unirule Institute of Economics (Issue No. 2, 2008). 
 
The size of international wealth transfer is difficult to estimate primarily due to lack of 
availability of domestic and international price information. We estimate the subsidies to foreign 
countries resulting from the difference between domestic and overseas energy and metals prices.  
 
Table 4: Export subsidies to foreign countries in 2004 as a result of energy price 
undervaluation 
 Difference 
between 
domestic 
Energy 
consumption 
Total 
price 
difference 
Manufacturing 
energy 
consumption 
Price 
difference for 
manufacturing 
Price 
difference 
for 
 and 
international 
prices 
(yuan/ton) 
(million 
yuan) 
energy 
consumption 
(million yuan) 
energy 
intensity 
of 
industrial 
finished 
goods for 
export 
(million 
yuan) 
Coal (thousand 
tons) 
75① 1935960 145197 731020 54823 12933 
Coke (thousand 
tons) 
75② 172670.1 12950 167750 12582 2968 
crude oil 
(thousand tons) 
0③ 287493.1 0    
Gasoline 
(thousand tons) 
791④ 46957.6 37143 4040 3195 754 
kerosene(thousand 
tons) 
814⑤ 10608.6 8635 540 438 103 
Diesel (thousand 
tons) 
837④ 98951.6 82822 12690 10516 2504 
Fuel oil (thousand 
tons) 
814⑤ 47834.8 38938 20500 16686 3936 
Natural gas 
(million cubic 
meters ) 
0.2368⑥ 39672 9394 19878.67 4706 1110 
Electricity 
(million kilowatt) 
0.2235⑦ 2797137 491060 1130207.37 252622 59594 
Total   826139  355668 83902 
Notes: 
    1. The offshore price of export steam coal in May 2005 was higher than the domestic price by 
40 to 110 yuan; here we take a median value. In 2004, the average price of coal internationally 
was 54.69 US dollars (export price of South African coal) and 56.73 US dollars (offshore price of 
Australian thermal coal), which was higher than the 2005 price by five to six US dollars. 
2. Calculated comparing coal prices. 
3. China’s crude oil price since 2002 integration with international prices. 
4. Difference between domestic ex-factory price and international price. 
5. Mean price difference of gas and diesel. 
6. Mean ex-factory price of natural gas was 593 yuan/1,000 cubic meters in 2004, which is 
equivalent to 41.7 per cent, 40 per cent, and 45.2 per cent of LNG price upon shipment in Japan, 
South Korea and EU in the same year. Here, the mean difference of 40 per cent is adopted. 
7. After-tax electricity tariff in the Unites States, Italy, Japan, and South Korea were 7.19, 
8.35, 14.33, 6, 7.04, and 7.20 cents/kWh (in US dollars). This figure was 4.5 US cents in China. 
We set the international price here at 7.20 cents/kWh.. 
 Source: Li Sheng (honorary editor-in-chief) and Zhang Ping (editor-in-chief): Resource Price 
Reform: Overall Philosophy, Strategies and Support Measures, page 66, 180, 197 and 218. China 
Statistical Yearbook (2006). 
 
Table 5: Export subsidies to foreign countries arising from metal price undervaluation in 
2004 
 Steel Copper Aluminum Total 
Domestic price (thousand yuan) 41814 295695 165475  
Import price (thousand yuan) 58725 271757 263445  
Export price (thousand yuan) 48474 317662 215110  
Domestic price - import price 
(thousand yuan) 
-16911 23938 -97970  
Domestic price - export price (thousand 
yuan) 
-6660 -21967 -49635  
Production quantity (thousand tons) 319757.2 2202.1 6690.4 ⑥  
Consumption quantity (thousand tons) 
① 
334827.2 3002.2 6869.5  
Manufacturing consumption quantity 
(thousand tons) ② 
184690.7 1656 3789.2  
Consumption quantity in export sector 
(thousand tons) ③ 
43568.5 369.4 893.9  
Price difference of metal consumption 
in export sector I (thousand yuan) ④ 
-73678690.4 884269.7 -8757538.3 81551959 
Price difference of metal consumption 
in export sector II (thousand yuan) ⑤ 
-29016621 -811461 -4436872.7 34264954.7 
Notes: 
    1. Consumption quantity equals production quantity plus import quantity minus export 
quantity; 
2. Manufacturing consumption quantity is calculated as follows: total consumption quantity 
multiplied by the share of manufacturing intermediate inputs. As 2004 information is not available, 
this share is calculating using statistics from 2002 inputs and outputs. 
3. Consumption in export sector is equal to manufacturing consumption quantity multiplied 
by the share of industrial finished goods in total manufacturing output. 
4. Calculated according to the difference between domestic price and import price; 
5. Calculated according to the difference between domestic price and import price; 
6. Electrolytic aluminum.  
 
Source: Domestic prices were provided by He Hui of the National Logistics Information Center; 
other prices are calculated from China Statistical Yearbook: 2005 and 2006. 
 
Using the difference between domestic and overseas prices as our base, we calculated the 
export subsidies for energy and major metals (steel, copper, and aluminum) in 2004; these 
subsidies, in turn, arose from price undervaluation in the range of 118.167 billion yuan to185.454 
billion yuan. Considering the degree to which other resource factors are undervalued, we estimate 
 that subsidies to foreign consumers would be many times higher than this figure. Given that the 
output of energy and metals accounts for 16.33 per cent of total intermediate inputs (output), 
corresponding export subsidies could have reached as much as 723.619 to 1,135.664 billion yuan, 
or 87.427 to137.211 billion US dollars, which would have accounted for 14.74 to 23.13 per cent of 
China’s total exports that year. This figure indicates the massive scale of reverse wealth transfer 
resulting from undervaluation of resource factor. 
 
V. Conclusions 
In a planned economy, factor price controls are a strategic way for government to control the 
economy and promote growth. Today, 30 years since reform and opening, however, China has 
failed to resolve this problem in the context of becoming an emerging market economy and 
participating in global trade. This suggests that China’s transition towards a market economy is far 
from complete. We argue that causes go beyond institutional inertia and are an inevitable result of 
economic policies targeted at growth and stability. Current policies must be reviewed from the 
strategic perspective of China’s unique development path if the Chinese government is to launch 
reform in the real sense. 
Factor price distortion has obvious consequences. Aside from losses in the efficiency of 
resource allocation, it produces wealth transfer among different social groups. Based on this 
paper’s estimates, wealth transfer is of a scale larger than previously imagined; as China continues 
to reform and develop, the increasingly disproportionate power of vested interests and the 
resulting social resentment are likely to be a major hazard. It is a question that must be addressed 
in the next step of China’s reform. 
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